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Abstract
The research in this dissertation was conducted to measure the accessibility, presentation, and
format of active shooter protocol for college faculty and staff at institutions of higher education
in the state of New Jersey. The study further explores the need for availability of active shooter
policy given the unfortunate growing problem of active shooters taking place at institutions of
higher education across the country. Since the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007, the New Jersey
Campus Security Task Force made recommendations to then Governor Corzine’s administration.
Institutions of higher education have since embraced active shooter protocol from various source
materials including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland
Security. With a modern culture that currently relies heavily on the internet for information the
research focuses on the accessibility of active shooter policy on various institution’s websites.
An active shooter protocol was developed in conjunction with mental health
professionals, law enforcement officials, and higher education administrators. Current research
shows that institutions that did or did not have an active shooter protocol in place for the campus
community still experienced an active shooter event. Several of those institutions reviewed their
policies and made determinations if major changes were needed. Current research shows that
there has been a shift in the thought process of how to handle an active shooter event on campus.
A traditional policy was that of lockdown in your current location and wait for instructions from
law enforcement. A shift to a run, hide, and fight policy has been embraced throughout
institutions of higher education.
Past research has shown that active shooters are more likely to come from the campus
community. In order to reduce liability and increase safety, administrators at institutions of
higher education can increase the availability of their active shooter protocol to their campus
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community. This research explores the online accessibility and source material of such protocols
across varying institutions in New Jersey.
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Chapter 1: Background
A growing issue of concern on college campuses today is the ability of administrators and
leaders to effectively manage active shooter violence on campus. For example, on April 4, 2007,
an active shooter on the campus of Virginia Tech left 32 people dead (Liu et al., 2008, p. 1).
After this incident, the question arose of how to manage communication and response by
university leaders during the crises. At the time, Virginia Tech’s emergency plan called for the
establishment of an emergency operations center; however, no such entity was established,
resulting in a lack of adequate communication from the university to its stakeholders (Davies,
2008, p. 12). During crisis events such as mass shootings on campus, it is vital that sensitive
information is not leaked that could jeopardize an investigation while at the same time releasing
information to families, friends, and the media. Liu et al. (2008) noted: “When dealing with
crisis and disaster situations, public officials, including emergency managers and others
responsible for the control and flow of crisis information, are concerned that uninformed citizens
will spread rumors and inaccurate information” (p. 1).
In a study of 600 campus police chiefs and public safety directors at 4-year colleges and
universities, Thompson et al. (2010) stated, “Less than one third reported that their faculty were
regularly trained as to what steps to take in the classroom during an ‘active shooter’ situation
(32%) nor were the faculty trained to identify troubled students, or who they should inform, and
how to make referrals for troubled students (30%)” (p. 251). In addition, the Thompson et al.
study identified members of the campus community that should take either a lead or major role
in minimizing firearms violence on campus. Their study found that 49% of college professors
should take a major role as well as 43% of college administrators (p. 251). According to
Williams (2017), “The participant who expressed that he was aware of where to find procedures
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for responding to the crisis also articulated that he understood how to respond to an active
shooter crisis” (p. 62).
In 2007, the Campus Security Task Force Report recommendations were submitted to
then Governor Jon Corzine. Those recommendations tasked colleges and universities with
campus security and law enforcement agencies to provide policies for active shooters (Canas &
Oates, 2007, p. 10). It also recommended colleges and universities with non-sworn public safety
departments to work in association with local law enforcement agencies to provide safety
policies concerning active shooters (Canas & Oates, 2007, p. 10). As of 2019, 22 states have
legislation addressing firearms on public campuses, including in New Jersey (Whinnery et al.,
2019, pp. 1–4). In New Jersey, legislation prevents individuals from possessing firearms on any
public college or university campus (Whinnery et al., 2019, pp. 1–4). There are eight states that
currently allow individuals to carry concealed weapons on college campuses (Whinnery et al.,
2019, pp. 1–4). As of 2019, four states including Arkansas, New York, Iowa, and West Virginia
have enacted legislation specifically addressing gun violence on campus (Erwin, 2019, pp. 1–4).
The purpose of this study is to determine how institutions of higher education in New Jersey
responded to various mandates by communicating policies to faculty to address active shooter
events and prepare faculty for active shooter encounters on campus through professional
development resources.1

1

The New Jersey Department of Higher Education groups institutions of higher education into the

following categories: public research universities, state colleges and universities, community colleges, independent
four-year, proprietary institutions with degree granting authority, Talmudical and theological seminaries, and
independent two-four-year institutions.
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There are differences in institutional characteristics, i.e., public research universities,
state colleges and universities, community colleges, independent four-year, proprietary
institutions with degree granting authority, Talmudical and theological seminaries, independent
2-year institutions, and independent 3-year institutions. Institutional differences are based on the
institution’s education purposes. For instance, a university such as Rutgers, which has a large
student population, receives state funding, and is primarily a research institution, serves a
different purpose than smaller institutions that may grant degrees but are more specific in nature
such as the New Brunswick Theological or Princeton Theological whose primary role is to
produce graduates that specialize in religion. Besides an institution’s purpose, campus size also
plays a role in the differences among institutions. For instance, a rabbinical college, given its
smaller student population, will have a smaller campus than that of a community college;
however, both institutions have degree granting authority.
The research project sought to answer the following research questions and subquestions:


Research Question 1. To what extent and in what ways have institutions of higher
education (IHEs) in New Jersey developed policies for addressing “active
shooter” events on campus and have prepared their front-line teaching faculty for
“active shooter” encounters in the academic workplace?
o Research Question 1a. How many institutions have put in place formal,
written “active shooter” policies?
o Research Question 1b. How are these policies communicated to academic
staff?
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Research Question 2. How are active shooter policies presented on the reported
institutions’ websites?
o Research Question 2a. Where are they located on the website?
o Research Question 2b. In what format are the policies presented? For
example, online instructions/ pdf files, or web training videos.
o Research Question 2c. How are they accessed by faculty?
o Research Question 2d. Are there differences in policies and/or in the
dissemination of policies depending on the type of institution?
The Policy Response to Campus Violence

From school years 2001–2002 to 2005–2006 compared to 2011–2012 to 2015–2016,
shootings on campus rose 153% and casualties rose 241% (Cannon, 2016, p. 2). Given the
breakout of violent incidents on college campuses, has there been any new government or
university policy to educate or train faculty in order to handle an active shooter event on
campus? According to Thompson et al. (2010), “In the wake of shootings that have occurred at
campuses such as Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University, college administrators,
professors, and campus law enforcement officers are often criticized for not being proactive in
preventing such firearm tragedies” (p. 248). College administrators are in a unique position that
requires them to train faculty and prepare their police departments to recognize future
perpetrators. Miller et al. (2010) stated, “Previous research that focused on weapon carrying
among college students across the US found that 11% of male students and 4% of female
students reported having carried weapons (gun, knife, etc.) on campus” (p. 57). Based on the data
of this past research, one may infer that weapons are being carried on college campuses by
students.

5

In the aftermath of the Virginia Tech massacre, the Virginia State Legislature as well as
Virginia Tech created new policies to assist in identifying potential threats of active shooters on
campus. Virginia Tech (n.d.) in accordance with Virginia State Code, established the Violence
Prevention Committee and Threat Assessment Team. The Virginia State Code states that each
public institution shall establish policies and procedures to prevent campus violence. Each
institution’s governing board shall establish a violence prevention committee composed of
student affairs, law enforcement, human resources, counseling services, and residence life. The
committee shall provide guidance to students, faculty, and staff to take appropriate actions for
individuals that display threatening behavior. The governing boards shall also compose a threat
assessment team including members from law enforcement, mental health professionals, student
affairs, human resources, and university counsel. The threat assessment team when warranted
must obtain the criminal history of the suspect. Lastly, no member of the threat assessment team
shall redisclose any criminal history of the potential suspect. As a result, Virginia Tech changed
its policy which now states:
The mission of the team is to determine if an individual poses, or may pose a threat of
violence to self, others, or the Virginia Tech community and to intervene to avert the
threat and maintain the safety of the situation. The team responds to behaviors exhibited
by students, employees, visitors, and non-affiliated persons prior to a critical incident in
an attempt to prevent violence so that the Virginia Tech campus remains a safe and
secure working environment (Virginia Tech, n.d., para 3).
Gun violence on college campuses has been on the rise. Since 2001 both shootings and
casualties have increased. During the first five school years examined (2001-2002 to 2005-2006),
there were a total of 40 recorded shooting incidents on or near college campuses. The number of
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shootings increased 23% to 49 incidents during the 2006-2007 to 2010-2011 school years.
Shootings doubled during the next five school years (2011–2012 to 2015–2016), increasing to
101 incidents—a 153% increase compared to the 2001–2002 to 2005–2006 school years.
Tragically, between 2001–2002 and 2005–2006, there were 61 total casualties during college
shooting incidents. During the 2006–2007 to 2010–2011 school years, casualties nearly tripled,
increasing to 168 killed or wounded. Forty-two percent of these victims were shot during the
mass shootings at Virginia Tech (49) and Northern Illinois University (21). Casualties continued
to climb to 208 (24%) during the last five school years—a 241% increase compared to the 20012002 to 2005-2006 school years (Cannon, 2016, p. 25). Cannon also contended:
In the 190 shooting incidents between the 2001-2002 and 2015-2016 school years, 437
people were shot, including 167 killed and 270 wounded. The victims included 290
students, 77 individuals not associated with the college, 40 employees, and five former
students (we were unable to determine the relationship of 25 victims). An estimated 2.5
million students were enrolled at the 142 colleges where shootings occurred, and, thus,
were directly or indirectly exposed to gun violence. (p. 5)
More recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) published its statistics for active
shooter incidents across the nation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2020). From 2016 to 2020
the FBI measured the amount of active shooter incidents. 2020 represented a 33% increase in
active shooter events from 2019 as well as a 100% increase from 2016.2 A timeline of the
occurrence of active shooter incidents in recent years is provided in Figure 1, together with how

2

https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-in-the-us-2020-070121.pdf/view
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these incidents line up with the work of the NJ Campus Security Task Force, which provided
guidance on active shooter prevention.
Figure 1
Recent Active Shooter Timeline

Summary
Other states have developed policies to address active shooter events and educate faculty.
This research is intended to analyze the policy response in New Jersey. As stated earlier, the
2007 Campus Security Task Force Report required college and university security and law
enforcement agencies to provide policies addressing active shooters. As of 2019 New Jersey is
one of 22 states that specifically address the possession of firearms on public campuses. The
New Jersey law prohibits individuals from carrying firearms on public campuses. The following
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chapter will address the identity of active shooters, history of active shooters, policy response,
and professional development. Chapter 3 will address data sources as well as the sample
collected for the research questions. Later in this study, variables, quantitative analysis, and
subsidiary questions will be explained, presented, and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

9

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Many incidents of active shooters and violence on campus have occurred on college
campuses throughout the years. States have made headway in addressing other forms of campus
violence. As of 2019, 95 bills of legislation were introduced in 27 states and the District of
Columbia (Sarubbi, 2019, pp. 1–6). Conversely, in 2019, 47 bills of legislation were introduced
in 20 states with only 4 bills being enacted addressing gun violence (Erwin, 2019, pp. 1–4). An
examination of the available literature defines what an active shooter is, gives a history of active
shooter events, responses by education, methods, and a summary.
Identity of an Active Shooter
In 2013 the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 was signed into law
by the president. This allowed the Attorney General to assist state law enforcement officials to
request assistance in the investigation of shootings and mass killings from the federal
government (Blair & Schweit, 2014, p. 4). This made the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
the lead in researching and assisting local, county, state, and campus police agencies to identify
potential threats and respond to active shooters. The FBI has published on their website their
active shooter resources. They define an active shooter as, “…An individual actively engaged in
killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area, and recent active shooter incidents have
underscored the need for a coordinated response by law enforcement and others to save lives”
(FBI, 2018, p. 1).3 The FBI (2018) also mentioned that they provide “operational, behaviorally-
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Although the FBI’s definition of active shooter makes no mention of a firearm usage, the definition is

located under Active Shooter Resources located at https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partnerengagement/active-shooter-resources
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based threat assessment and threat management services to help detect and prevent acts of
targeted violence, helping academic, mental health, business, community, law enforcement, and
government entities recognize and disrupt potential active shooters who may be on a trajectory
toward violence” (FBI, 2018, p. 1). The FBI recognizes the need for and importance of
identifying the so-called red flag behaviors and the responsibility of responding to them
accordingly.
Besides the massacre at Virginia Tech, other mass shootings have garnered the attention
of the federal government. One such shooting was the Newtown Connecticut massacre. In
response to the Newtown, Connecticut school shootings, the FBI—with the Department of
Justices’ bureau of Justice Assistance—teamed up with the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid
Response Training (ALERRT) program, which was developed in Texas, supported by the state
of Texas, and housed at Texas State University(FBI, 2018). The ALERRT program assists local
agencies in developing procedures for local emergency services to train and respond to active
shooter incidents. The FBI field offices host exercises that focus on how to respond and recover
from an active shooter incident. The goal of the exercises are to bring together federal, state and
local law enforcement, fire, EMS, and federal, district, county, and state attorneys (FBI, 2018).
The ALERRT program is just one tool that college campuses can utilize and partake in.
As of 2016, most private colleges and universities do not have an active shooter policy in
place (Myers, 2016, p. 89). According to Silver et al. (2018), “In 2017 there were 30 separate
active shootings in the United States, the largest number ever recorded by the FBI in a one-year
period” (p. 6). The Silver et al. study assists in identifying active shooters. Although the study of
active shooters is not college specific, the study is meant for people in various professions
including educators to identify active shooters. It is important to note that in their study sample
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of 63 shooters, the assailants “did not appear to be uniform in any way such that they could be
readily identified prior to attacking based on demographics alone. The youngest active shooter
was 12 years old and the oldest was 88 years old with an average age of 37.8 years” (Silver et al.,
2018, p. 9). Males made up 94% of shooters and none of the shooters under the age of 18
completed high school (Silver et al., 2018, p. 10).
In regard to college campus safety, it is important to note that 5% of shooters completed a
master’s or doctorate, 2% had some graduate education, 7% had completed a four-year college
degree, 11% attended a four-year college, and 11% attended community college or trade school
(Silver et al., 2018, p. 10). Shooters varied by race with 63% white, 16% black, 10% Asian, 6%
Hispanic, 3% Middle Eastern, and 2% Native American (Silver et al., 2018, p. 10). Seven
percent of shooters were students (Silver et al., 2018, p. 11). According to the Silver et al.:
Nineteen of the active shooters aged 18 and over (35%) had adult convictions prior to the
active shooting event. The study also found that 62% of the active shooters had a history
of acting in an abusive, harassing, or oppressive way, 16% had engaged in intimate
partner violence, and 11% had engaged in stalking-related conduct. (p. 11–12)
With regard to active shooter demographics, Silver and the FBI highlighted two important key
factors. Aside, from gender, there is no specific profile of an active shooter. Most important to
note is the absence of a violent criminal history in the majority of active shooters(Silver, 2018).
It is important to take from the study that active shooters can be anyone at almost any age.
Gender is overwhelmingly male accounting for 94% of active shooters sampled by the FBI
(2018, p. 10).
The FBI recognizes the next stage in identifying potential active shooters as the planning
and preparation stage. Among most shooters (73%) there was a known connection between the
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shooter and the scene of the attack, a place of employment or former place of employment
accounted for those 18 and older (35%), and in most cases a school or former school for those 18
and younger(88%), indicating that in most cases the shooter had familiarity with the scene and
persons located there. Conversely, active shooters without affiliation to the targeted scene of the
incident behaved differently (Silver, 2018). Faculty and a college administration must
understand their vulnerability to an active shooter’s potential knowledge of campus grounds and
class times.
The Silver et al. study also researched specifically how these active shooters were able to
obtain the firearms used to carry out the shootings. Most often (40%), the shooter purchased a
firearm legally for the purpose of carrying out the attack. While only a small number purchased
firearms illegally (2%) stole the firearm (6%), some (11%) borrowed or used a firearm from a
person known to them, and large number of shooters (35%) had a firearm already in their
possession. Based on the amount of time they possessed the firearm it not appear that the
firearm was obtained for the purpose of committing the shooting(Silver, 2018).
It is also important to note that “77% of active shooters spent a week or longer planning their
attack, and 46% spent a week or longer preparing” (Silver et al., 2018, p. 15). “Planning,”
according to the Silver et al. study, is defined as the full range of considerations the shooter must
carry out in the attack. They include the decision to engage in violence, selecting specific or
random targets, conducting surveillance, and addressing all ancillary practical issues such as
victim schedules, transportation, and site access (Silver et al., 2018, p. 13). “Preparing” is
defined as actions taken to procure the means for the attack, typically items such as a handgun or
rifle, ammunition, special clothing and/or body armor (Silver et al., 2018, p. 14).
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Outside stressors have an impact on the behavior of active shooters. They have the
potential to trigger unsettling behavior that may cause an individual to commit such crimes. The
Silver et al. (2018) study also addresses stressors and defines what they are. According to Silver
et al., “Stressors are physical, psychological, or social forces that place real or perceived
demands/pressures on an individual and which may cause psychological and/or physical
distress” (p. 15). Silver et al. also alleged that “stress is considered to be a well-established
correlate of criminal behavior” (p. 15).
The most prevalent of all stressors found in the study conducted was that of mental health
problems. Past research has shown that failing to cope with stress can lead to disease. Dr. Hans
Selye’s (1950) extensive research and theory on disease adaptation to stress is derived from a
failure to cope with the stressor thus, leading to disease. The general adaptation syndrome
described as stress is any factor that endangers life unless it is met by an adequate adaptation
response. Adaptability and stress are fundamental to life itself and every vital organ in the body
participates in adapting to stress (Selye, 1950, p. 1383). Selye’s research stated that disease
consists of damage and defense. The damage caused by stress and the defense adaptation by that
organ lead to an adaptation to which individuals will react differently (Selye, 1950, p. 1392). For
active shooters, stress and mental health are linked. When applying Selye’s theory to active
shooters, their criminal activity is a result of the body’s inability to mount a defense against
stress. Thus, causing the shooter to cope with disease through criminal activity.
Later in this research, several examples of individuals will demonstrate how outside
stressors will affect their mental health. The single most stressor applied to the majority of the
sample was mental health (62%). Other stressors present (20%) were attributed to financial
strain, employment, relationship and friendship conflicts, marital issues, substance abuse, school
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conflicts and physical injury (Silver, 2018). Mental health is a clear indicator of active shooter
behavior. Even the study conducted by Silver et al. (2018) suggested that mental health is a
major and prevalent issue among the active shooter sample. Of the 16 cases where there was a
diagnosis before the shooting, 12 had a mood disorder, four with anxiety disorder, three with
psychotic disorder, two with personality disorder, one Autism spectrum, one developmental, and
one described as ‘other’ (Silver, 2018). Understanding the prevalence of mental health in active
shooter cases is important for recognizing the signs of potential active shooter behavior.
The United States’ population as a whole sees stunning rates of mental health disorders.
According to Silver et al. (2018), “Some studies indicate that nearly half of the U.S. population
experiences symptoms of mental illness over their lifetime, with population estimates of the
lifetime prevalence of diagnosable mental illness among U.S. adults at 46%, with 9% meeting
the criteria for a personality disorder” (p. 17). It is important to know the prevalence of mental
health cases on campus. Clearly, there are laws such as HIPPA in place that protect the rights of
medical patients; however, awareness and training to observe indicators can help prevent the
next incident of an active shooter. The Silver et al. (2018) study also addressed concerning
behaviors displayed by potential active shooters. According to Silver et al., “Concerning
behaviors are observable behaviors exhibited by the active shooter” (p. 17). Concerning
behaviors were exhibited in multiple ways. On average, there were 4.7 concerning behavior per
shooter. Those behaviors were related to mental health, interpersonal interactions, leakage
(communication to a third-party or separate threats), and the quality of the communication. Four
to five behaviors were exhibited over time by each shooter. Early interaction and detection of
these behaviors may help mitigate future violence (Silver, 2018).
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The study also addressed how these behaviors are observed and by whom. The most
common way concerning behaviors were detected was by verbal communication by the shooter
(95%), observing physical actions (86%), written communication (27%), behavior displayed
online (16%), and a majority (89%) communicated in multiple ways (Silver, 2018).
When addressing active shooters on campus, faculty and administrators can and do play a vital
role in observing these behaviors.
The study stated that school staff accounted for 75% of all those who observed
concerning behaviors (Silver et al., 2018, p. 20). The most common responses were to
“communicate directly with the active shooter (83%) or do nothing (54%) (Silver, 2018, p. 21).
Fifty-one percent of staff reported the active shooter to a non-law enforcement authority, 49%
discussed concerning behavior with friends or family, and 41% reported the active shooter to law
enforcement” (Silver et al., 2018, p. 21). Awareness is vital to communicate with law
enforcement and administration to prevent an incident of an active shooter taking place.
Another important consideration is whom active shooters target. According to Silver et
al. (2018), “A target is defined as a person or group of people who were identifiable before the
shooting occurred and whom the active shooter intended to attack” (p. 23). Silver et al.
continued, “In cases where the victims could not reasonably have been identified prior to the
shooting, the active shooter was deemed to have selected the victims at random” (p. 23). The
study illustrates that 37% of active shooting victims were random, another 37% were both
targeted and random, and 27% were targeted (Silver et al., 2018, p. 23).
The study also inquired about the potential of suicidal tendencies displayed by active
shooters. According to Silver et al. (2018):
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Nearly half of the active shooters had suicidal ideation or engaged in suicide-related
behaviors at some time prior to the attack (48%), while five active shooters (8%)
displayed no such behaviors. An overwhelming majority of the 30 suicidal active
shooters showed signs of suicidal ideation (90%), and seven made actual suicide attempts
(23%). Nearly three-quarters (70%) of these behaviors occurred within one year of the
shooting (p. 24).
Suicidal behavior is one of many indicators that need to be addressed when preventing active
shooters from committing acts of violence on campus.
Regarding behavior, the FBI defined legacy tokens as “a communication prepared by the
offender to claim credit for the attack and articulate the motives underlying the shooting” (Silver
et al., 2018, p. 25). Legacy tokens were featured in the Virginia Tech shooting by shooter SuengHui Cho. According to Davies (2008), “Cho mailed to the NBC network a set of writings and
videotapes expressing contempt for his fellow students as privileged, spoiled, and morally
corrupted by a materialistic society” (p. 2). Davies continued, “He also mailed a letter to the
English Department, where he was a major, criticizing a faculty member for ‘holocausting’ him”
(p. 2).
One of the final behavioral concerns that should be observed is that of direct threats.
(While more than half of active shooters made threats (n=22), the majority (65%) of cases no
threats were target specific. The absence of a specific threat should not falsely reassure anyone
in a position to assess potential violence (Silver, 2018). A direct threat coupled with other
behavioral concerns should be taken seriously.
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History of Active Shooters
On August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman made his way to the top of the University of Texas’
Tower and began to open fire, killing 10 people and wounding 31 (Stearns, 2008, p. 300). Police
arrived on the scene and a shootout occurred. Two police officers were able to make their way up
the tower to Whitman’s location where he was shot and killed by police (Stearns, 2008, p. 300).
Like the Virginia Tech shooter, Whitman displayed signs of disturbing behavior that led up to his
rampage. For instance, Whitman fantasized about going to the top of the tower with a deer rifle
and shooting people (Scott-Coe, 2017, p. 297). A later autopsy revealed Whitman had a brain
tumor, yet it has been disputed as to whether the tumor actually caused the incident.
Furthermore, his threats and fantasies were not taken seriously (Stearns, 2008, p. 301).
Whitman himself experienced living with an abusive father. According to Scott-Coe
(2017):
It must be pointed out that the night before his rampage, Charles Whitman murdered
Kathy [his wife] as well as his own mother, Margaret, a devout Catholic who had moved
to Austin only three months earlier to separate from her physically abusive husband—the
father Whitman said he hated. (p. 311)
Kathy, Whitman’s wife, reported his violent behavior to her family. She had expressed his
violence to her parents prior to the shooting. She would tell them that although she loved him,
she wished they never met (Scott-Coe, 2017, p. 311). It is important to point out that Whitman,
like Cho, expressed his behavior to other people prior to the shooting. Although Whitman’s wife
expressed to others her wariness about Charles’ concerning behavior, it was at a time when
domestic abuse was treated as low priority and private matters (Scott-Coe, 2017, p. 311).
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An analysis of the Virginia Tech shooting provides more details on the resources that
were made available to Cho prior to the incident. According to History.com (2011), “The
Virginia Tech shooting began around 7:15 a.m., when Cho, a 23-year-old senior and English
major at Blacksburg-based Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, shot a female
freshman and a male resident assistant in a campus dormitory before fleeing the building.” The
police responded with the information available and presented to them at the time. History.com
(2011) continued, “Police were soon on the scene; unaware of the gunman’s identity, they
initially pursued the female victim’s boyfriend as a suspect in what they believed to be an
isolated domestic-violence incident” (para. 3). This, however, turned out to not be true at all.
The gunman, Cho, made his way to another campus building and began the rampage
again:
Around 9:40 a.m., Cho, armed with a 9-millimeter handgun, a 22-caliber handgun and
hundreds of rounds of ammunition, entered a classroom building, chained and locked
several main doors and went from room to room shooting people. Approximately 10
minutes after the rampage began, he died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
(History.com, para, 4)
While Cho was at Norris Hall, the second location of his incident, he killed 30 more people.
According to Davis (2008), “By then 30 more people, 25 students and five faculty, were dead—
plus, of course, Cho himself” (p. 10). In two hours, 33 people were dead and 17 wounded
(Davies, 2008, p. 10).
Prior to the massacre, it was reported that Cho was exhibiting disturbing and unusual
behavior. In a study by Jia Wang and Holly M. Hutchins (2010), the authors examined the
incident and provided information on what went wrong and how the university may have
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prevented the incident from occurring. According to Wang and Hutchins (2010), “At the
individual level, Cho’s unusual behavior (e.g., stalking, taking cell-phone photos of female
students during class, violent writing, and unwillingness to participate in classes) was reported
on several occasions by students and faculty, yet resulted in little serious action by the
university” (p. 558). Wang and Hutchins (2010) also stated that “The Virginia Tech Care Team
took no action even when alerted by the English Department and residence advisors about Cho’s
deviant behavior in class and in the dorm” (p. 558). Furthermore, a female student
reported Seung-Hui Cho to campus police about his behavior. Cho sent a suicidal phone message
to his roommate (Davies, 2008, p. 5). The message was reported to campus police and Cho
received medical treatment.
The university failed to address the behavior of Cho in the beginning stages of the
incident. In one such incident Cho himself contacted the University’s Cook Counseling Center.
In that case, Cho received no treatment. According to Davies (2008), “Both times, a counselor
collected personal information by telephone, but Cho never was diagnosed or treated” (p. 11). At
one point Cho was ordered into the mental facility at St. Alban’s, located at Carilion Clinic
Hospital. While at St. Alban’s, the staff made another appointment for Cho to meet with the
counselors at Cook Counseling Center. According to Davies (2008):
In 15 days, the counseling center had talked with Cho three times. But no one called his
parents to tell them that he had been admitted to a mental-care facility under a Temporary
Detention Order or ask them whether he had a history of mental health problems—and, if
he did, whether they would make his mental-health records available to staff at Virginia
Tech. (p. 11)
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In addition, the state of Virginia’s mental health system was also found to be woefully
inadequate in assisting the university in handling individuals exhibiting violent behavior.
According to Davies (2008), “The systems have been under-funded for years, and states have not
provided the out-patient resources needed to make de-institutionalization of persons with mental
disabilities a viable policy” (p. 10).
Virginia Tech had a policy in place to address emergencies titled “Emergency Response
Plan of 2005;” however, it did not address campus shootings. According to Wang and Hutchins
(2010), “This plan describes preparedness for and responses to a variety of emergencies such as
weather problems, fires, and terrorism, but there was nothing specific to campus shootings” (p.
559). Public health, fire, and natural disaster emergencies were all addressed in their plan;
however, no strategy existed for an active shooter.
In response to the situation Wang and Hutchins (2010) stated that “the Virginia Tech
police’s response to the Norris Hall shootings was prompt and effective as was triage and
evacuation of the wounded” (p. 561). The university, however, failed to provide adequate
communication and information. According to Wang and Hutchins, “Nevertheless, despite being
called for by Virginia Tech’s Emergency Plan, the university did not establish an emergency
operations center, which could have been a central locus for all communications” (p. 561).
Having one line of communication for all emergency personnel and university officials along
with a centralized location to disseminate information could have helped the university provide
useful information to students and the public.
The next incident involves the case of Dr. Amy Bishop. She was charged in the shooting
of six faculty members at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. According to Dewan et al.
(2010), “The shootings took place after Dr. Bishop learned that she had lost her long battle to
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gain academic tenure at the university” (p. 2). In a New York Times article, Dewan et al. (2010)
chronicled the signs of future deadly behavior: “Amy Bishop was identified as the professor who
had been arrested in the shooting of six faculty members at the University of Alabama
in Huntsville on Feb. 12” (p. 1). Throughout her life, the professor displayed violent behavior
and thoughts consistent with that of someone capable of being an active shooter. In an incident at
the university, it was reported that Dr. Bishop threatened to release a germ bomb at the
university. According to Dewan et al. (2010), “Several people with connections to the
university’s biology department warned that Dr. Bishop, a neuroscientist with a Harvard Ph.D.,
might have booby-trapped the science building with some sort of ‘herpes bomb,’ police officials
said, designed to spread the dangerous virus” (p. 1).
The local police cleared the building and yet evidence of her potentially violent behavior
was recovered. Dewan et al. (2010) recounts, “The police had already swept every room of the
science building, finding nothing but a 9-millimeter handgun” (p. 1). Throughout her career and
life, Dr. Bishop displayed a multitude of signs and symptoms of potentially violent behavior.
According to Dewan et al. (2010), “In 1986, not long after a family argument, Amy Bishop shot
and killed her brother, Seth, 19, with her father’s 12-gauge shotgun, putting a gaping hole in his
left chest and tearing open his aorta, according to the police report” (p. 2). Dewan et al.
continued, “But Amy Bishop was not charged with a crime, and the shooting was never fully
investigated by the police” (p. 2). Dr. Bishop was never charged with a crime; however, she
continued to display violent behavior. The behavior continued in 1994. According to Dewan et
al. (2010), “In 1994, she and her husband were questioned in a mail bomb plot against a doctor at
Harvard, where she obtained her Ph.D. and remained on and off for nearly a decade to conduct
postdoctoral research” (p. 3). Again, she was never charged with a crime. Dewan et al. (2010)
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stated that in June of 2000 “The United States Postal Service was ‘closing the file’ on its separate
investigation” (p. 7).
Dr. Bishop’s negative behavior affected her students as well. According to Dewan et al.
(2010), “Graduate students did not last long in her laboratory, and those familiar with the
department said that most transferred to a different one before completing their degree” (p. 8).
Students would complain about their work environment and her poor attitude towards
them. Dewan et al. added, “She was known to have cyclical ‘flip-outs,’ as one former student
described them,that pushed one graduate student after another out of her laboratory” (p. 3).
Her violent behavior extended outside the realms of academia where she was involved in
another violent outburst in 2002. According to Dewan et al. (2010), “In 2002, she was charged
with assault after punching a woman in the head at an International House of Pancakes (IHOP) in
Peabody, Massachusetts. The woman had taken the last booster seat and according to the police
report, Dr. Bishop demanded it for one of her children, shouting, ‘I am Dr. Amy Bishop!’” (p. 2).
Dr. Bishop was sentenced to probation as a result of the assault at IHOP (Dewan et al., 2010, p.
7).
Violence on campus is not limited to the educators. Students also account for shootings
on campus. For instance, the case of shooter Steven Kazmierczak is an example of a former
student committing an act of violence. Kazmierczak began graduate school at Northern Illinois
University (NIU) and later transferred to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champagne.
According to Thomas (2008), “Because the sociology program was not preparing him for his
intended profession in social work, he and his girlfriend transferred to the University of Illinois
Champaign/Urbana to begin graduate school in social work in the fall of 2007” (p.
109). Kazmierczak did not immediately display obvious red flags. He was in a relationship and
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was able to maintain academic success. Thomas (2008) noted that “He was an academic success,
graduating with nearly a 3.9 grade-point average, receiving prestigious academic honors” (p.
109). He was committed to helping people and had a desire to change society for the better.
According to Thomas (2008), “He viewed human suffering as anathema to civilized society, and
was described by friends, family, and acquaintances as gentle, caring, and nurturing” (p. 109).
Yet, it somehow all went wrong for Steven Kazmierczak. According to Thomas (2008),
“On February 14, 2008, Steve walked into room 101 in Cole Hall, a large NIU campus
auditorium seating nearly 500 students. On this day only about half of the 187 students enrolled
were present” (p. 110). Thomas added, “After firing six blasts from the shotgun and up to 42
from his handguns, six students were dead, at least 18 were injured from the shooting or from
trying to escape, the NIU campus community was left to reconstruct campus life” (p. 110).
Steven Kazmierczak had a history of depression, idolized famous killers, and had suicidal
thoughts. According to Boudreau & Zamost (2008), “In junior high school, Kazmierczak made a
bomb out of Drano, according to the documents. He also had a history of attempted suicides and
was hospitalized nine times for psychiatric issues before 2001” (p. 2).
His trouble battling with mental illness did not stop as he got older. Boudreau & Zamost
(2008) reported:
He spent three years at Thresholds, a psychiatric center in Chicago, according to
psychiatric records in the files. He was kicked out of the program for “non-compliance
and deception, the records state, adding Kazmierczak has had multiple hospitalizations
and impulsive behavior and suicidal gestures. (p. 2)
His struggle with mental illnesses did not end there. His attempt to join the Army was met with
failure due to his mental state. According to Thomas (2008), “He entered the army in 2001 and

24

was administratively discharged for psychological reasons after six months, after which he
started college” (p. 111). Thomas continued, “He constantly struggled with depression, for which
he periodically took medication” (p. 111). It is extremely important to note that Steven
Kazmierczak at one point stopped taking his medication. His former girlfriend, Jessica Baty
confirmed this. According to Boudreau & Zamost (2008), “Jessica Baty told CNN in an
exclusive interview three days after the shootings that Kazmierczak had stopped taking an
antidepression medication for obsessive-compulsive disorder and anxiety three weeks before the
shooting” (p. 2). Boudreau & Zamost added, “’He stopped taking it because he said that it made
him feel like a zombie and he just, you know, was lazy and that’s why he stopped taking it,’ Baty
said” (p. 2).
Steven Kazmierczak’s unusual behavior did not stop with his mental health status.
According to Boudreau & Zamost (2008), “Steven Kazmierczak was known as ‘strange Steve’ to
roommates, studied the Virginia Tech and Columbine massacres and idolized the sadistic killer
in the ‘Saw’ horror films” (p. 1). Boudreau & Zamost continued, “His freshman suitemates recall
him as being obsessed with infamous figures such as Adolf Hitler and Ted Bundy” (p. 2). Steven
Kazmierczak planned the massacre in advance. Approximately one week prior to the incident,
he purchased a shotgun and pistol. He left the University of Illinois and checked into the Dekalb
motel. He made no contact with anyone until the shooting (Thomas, 2008). Thomas (2008)
added, “The communications with his girlfriend in the days up to and especially after the
shootings indicate that he was saying ‘goodbye’” (p. 111). Putting all the pieces of this case
together reveals that Steven Kazmierczak did in fact display signs of potentially deadly behavior.
Although it was not sudden and drawn out over time there are clear indicators of active shooter
behavior. His obsession with infamous killers, battling mental depression and refusal to take
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medication, and isolation and ominous text messages in the days leading up to the incident, are
all signs and symptoms of potential active shooter behavior. These signs and symptoms cannot
be ignored and must be taken seriously in order to achieve the goal of prevention.
The Policy Response in New Jersey
In 2018, 34 bills were introduced in 20 States concerning gun violence on campus with
one state enacting law. In 2019, 47 bills of legislation were introduced in 18 states with 4 states
enacting law (Erwin, 2019, pp. 1–4). These bills attempted to determine which individuals are
permitted to carry weapons on campus. New Jersey is one of 22 states that prohibit individuals
from carrying weapons on campus. In the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting, the State of New
Jersey under Governor Jon S. Corzine commissioned a report regarding campus security. This
report, however, only made recommendations and there are no requirements for specific
mandated policy at this time. According to the report (Canas & Oates, 2007), “The Campus
Security Task Force recommendations are designed to provide colleges and universities with the
resources, support, and expertise they need to protect students, faculty, and staff” (p. 1).
The New Jersey Campus Security Task Force (2007) made several recommendations
regarding mental health awareness on campus. The first recommendation was that colleges and
universities should provide mental health awareness training to campus members annually.
Second, the report suggested that campus counseling centers be adequately staffed and
sufficiently funded with one full-time counselor per 1,500 students. Third, universities should
incorporate outreach activities that are designed to decrease the mental health stigma and interact
with students who would otherwise not seek counseling. Fourth, college administrations should
establish a crisis intervention team that includes all parts of campus, such as counseling,
academics, athletics, security, legal affairs, health services, and residential life. Lastly,
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universities should establish working relationships with outside mental health agencies and
hospitals (2007, pp. 5–8).
Active Shooter Threat Assessment
Dewey Cornell (2010), a professor of education at the University of Virginia, indicated
four different ways to assess and evaluate threats on campuses in his paper. According to
Cornell, “Threat assessment is a form of violence prevention that should be undertaken before a
gunman appears in the parking lot” (p. 10). The first phase of threat assessment is identification
of behavior. Any communication of intention to harm another, whether expressed to the victim
or someone else, or any behavior that indicates dangerous intentions, or planning to commit a
violent act (Cornell, 2010).
Universities should have a policy in place outlining when to report, how, and to whom.
All persons in help-providing and supervisory roles from dormitory advisors to mental health
counselors, faculty advisors, law enforcement, and deans must understand that threats must be
passed to the threat assessment team under a clear chain of reporting (Cornell, 2010).
Cornell (2010) concluded, “This is perhaps the primary lesson learned from the Virginia Tech
shooting” (p. 12).
Of course, not all threats will lead to an active shooter event happening on campus.
Cornell (2010) explained that the seriousness of the threat needs to be evaluated. There are two
points that Cornell makes regarding the seriousness of threats. They include distinguishing
individuals who make threats and those who may actually pose a threat. According to Cornell
(2010), “The focus of a threat assessment team is to gather as much information as possible to
determine the seriousness of the danger” (p. 12). Some threats could be made in the heat of the
moment or out of anger and frustration. It is the job of the threat assessment team to determine
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the seriousness of the threat. Cornell (2010) illustrated one example taken from the Silver study.
According to Cornell, “The most serious threats are those that are expressed by individuals who
are planning or preparing to carry out a violent act” (p. 13). In most school shootings that were
prevented by authorities before the incident could be carried out, the individual communicated
their intentions by making threats to a third party(Cornell, 2010).
The threat assessment team must understand the importance in determining the seriousness of the
threat by learning the signs and indicators of active shooters.
Thirdly, Cornell (2010) lays out a plan of intervention. In order to reduce the risk of
potential violence, victim notification and mental health patient rights can be a gray issue.
Cornell (2010) stated, “The duty of mental health professionals to warn potential victims—and,
more generally, to take protective actions to prevent violence—dates back to the California
Supreme Court ruling in the 1976 Tarasoff case” (p. 13). In this case a student at the University
of California, Berkley threatened a female student who was not interested in a dating
relationship. Although the treating psychologist acted accordingly by notifying the police, the
court ruled that the psychologist had been negligent. According to Cornell (2010), “Although the
treating psychologist took the threats seriously and notified the campus police, he was judged
negligent by the court for failing to take more directly protective action such as contacting and
warning the woman that she was in danger” (p. 13). While there is no perfect way to monitor and
prevent every case, it is important to understand that safety should be prioritized. Cornell (2010)
stated, “In our training programs, we remind mental health professionals that safety trumps
confidentiality” (p. 13).
Lastly, the assessment team should have a protocol to follow up on cases and keep
records. According to Cornell (2010), “Each case requires a follow up plan” (p. 13). Cornell
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(2010) continued, “In the simplest cases, this may involve merely maintaining a record of the
case and inviting the relevant parties to contact the team should there be any new developments
that raise concern” (pp. 13–14). Cornell (2010) added, “In cases where there has been an intense
interpersonal conflict or dispute, it may be appropriate for the team to check in periodically with
the referral source or other individuals who would be knowledgeable about the threat situation”
(p. 14). Record keeping on past students is also an important component of the threat assessment
team. According to Cornell (2010), “Even after graduation, a team should maintain records in the
event that there is a new incident or reason for concern” (p. 14). Cornell (2010) also pointed out
that “in the 2002 shooting at Appalachian School of Law and the 2007 shooting at Northern
Illinois University, the attacker was a former student” (p. 14).
Education and training are essential in getting information to the campus assessment
team. According to Cornell (2010), “Students, faculty, staff members, and the community as a
whole should be educated about the importance of seeking help for persons in distress, whether
or not a threat is involved” (p. 14). Cornell continued, “The institution’s help-providers must be
able to identify threats and understand the importance of reporting them immediately to the
team” (p. 14). Educating and training faculty should be at the forefront when it comes to
detecting and reporting information to the assessment team. The faster information is sent to the
team, a faster response to remedy the situation will be obtained.
In an additional study that applies Cornell’s (2010) findings to campus settings, Regehr et
al. noted, “Threats on campus take two primary forms, those in which the threatener and the
intended victim(s) are clearly identified (often involving repeated threats and stalking
behaviour); and those involving threats (often anonymous and online) to commit acts of larger
scale violence” (p. 141). In this study, the researchers further narrowly applied risk assessment
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and active shooter behavior. They identified the challenges that university administrators face
when developing risk assessment models as well as maintaining safety and security. These
challenges include fear contagion through mass media attention, responsibilities of all campus
members, and the demands for safety and security measures while facing the challenges of open
boundaries that may cause security issues (Regehr et al., 2017, p. 143).
Regehr et al. (2017) broke down these factors and offered up a model of assessment that
may offer a safer campus environment. Beginning with fear contagion, administrators are faced
with the challenge of balancing security measures with having an open learning environment.
The problem is further challenging when there appears to be a lack of transparency between
administrators and the media. In the aftermath of an active shooter incident, gaps in the
perception of safety are a challenge for administrators. Due to the privacy of victims and
suspects and maintaining the integrity of a law enforcement investigation, administrators are
often perceived as hiding important information from the public (Regehr et al., 2017, p. 143).
The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Administrators need to disseminate
information on a mass scale quickly and without interfering in an active investigation. In order to
disseminate large amounts of emergency information, most universities have established
protocols to ensure that the proper information is delivered to all campus community members in
a timely and efficient manner (Regehr et al., 2017, p. 143). Sending out information either during
or after an incident to large numbers of people is both challenging and critical. Yet, it is just one
factor in overall campus safety. While it is important to address the issue of presenting accurate
information to the university community, the next part in the Regehr et al. (2017) study sought
out solutions in managing threats on campus. As stated earlier there are two types of threats that
can be identified, individual and mass or cyber threats.
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The forensic mental health professional is critical to the expert team. They can assist
administrators with threat assessment, developing safety plans, managing communications, and
providing support to those individuals affected (Regehr et al., 2017, p. 145). In this application,
there is an emphasis on the role of the mental health professional to work closely with the other
university departments that play a role in safety, security, and wellbeing. The goal is to protect
the individuals or group identified, ensure campus members feel safe through effective
communication on shared and social media, increasing police and security presence, and utilizing
the expertise of the forensic mental health professional to develop strategies to mitigate fear
experienced by campus members (Regehr et al., p. 145). Simply put, the goal of the mental
health expert in leading threat and risk assessment teams is to provide enough detailed
information to accurately diagnose a problem before it turns into an active shooter. The Regehr
et al. study concluded that the mental health expert manages risk in order to subdue any known
threats of violence that has the potential to occur.
Current Anti-Shooter Methods and Protocol
There has been a shift in thought about how a response should be conducted in an active
shooter event. In a study to determine the effectiveness of “Run Hide Fight” (RHF) done by Jae
Yong Lee (2019), the library scenario from the Columbine High School shooting was recreated
in a run scenario. In the scenario, the author calculated a survivability rate of 92.1%, an all hide
scenario had a 5.16% rate, and a fight scenario had a 97.6% survivability rate (Lee, 2019, pp.
76–78). Although “Run Hide Fight” (RHF) was successful in the scenario, Lee points out that
active shooter events are fluid and circumstances vary. According to Lee (2019), “The RHF was
successful in decreasing the casualties for the staff and students that were seeking shelter in the
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library during the 1999 Columbine High School shooting. However, lowering casualties may not
be seen depending on the circumstances of active shooter incidents” (p. 79).
In the city of Independence, Missouri, educators are working with law enforcement to
develop a plan that teaches faculty to not become a target. According to Rick Montgomery
(2015) of the Kansas City Star, “The ultimate point is to present human targets with options
beyond the traditional response of locking doors, switching off lights and hoping the shooter
doesn’t spot them” (p. 3). Local law enforcement demonstrated to the staff and faculty how
important having a plan in place can be. After listening to the 911 tapes from the Columbine
High School shooting, the faculty “learned to run down empty hallways to nearby exits. Next,
they used desks and chairs to barricade their classrooms” (Montgomery, 2015, p. 4).
Subsequently, the police demonstrated how to physically overwhelm a suspect. According to
Montgomery (2015), “Next they threw plastic balls and learned to physically swarm a shooter,
separating gun from intruder and pinning that person to the floor” (p. 4). Montgomery also
mentioned that “nobody should be holding the gun when police arrive, they were told, because
officers will be targeting the shooter” (p. 4). This shift in policy has been seen across the nation.
According to Montgomery (2015):
Here and across the nation, the strategies for survival are pitched under the different
names: Escape, evade, engage. Get out, hide out, take out. Flee, fade, fight. But the idea
is the same: Provide options, and the safest one may not be crouching in the dark. (p. 4)
Teachers and faculty around the country are partaking in various types of training to
combat and respond to active shooters. According to Jacob Shamsian (2015) of Business Insider,
“ALICE—which stands for Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, and Evacuate—teaches students,
teachers, and school administrators how to defend themselves against school shooters” (p. 1).
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ALICE is a private company that offers students and faculty different strategies to fight back
against active shooters. According to Shamsian (2015), “The company teaches more advanced
methods than just lockdown drills. Its instructors inform teachers and students how to take action
if a shooter enters the building and, if they need to, how to fight back” (p. 1). Educators are
beginning to share the same thoughts on learning more options besides the traditional lockdown
method. Shamsian (2015) wrote that “Business Insider attended an ALICE training session at
Truman High School in Pennsylvania with about 50 teachers and school administrators present.
There, instructors asked, after one scenario, whether lockdown was good enough. Participants
unanimously thought it wasn’t” (p. 3). ALICE training seeks to empower educators and faculty
with tools to use in case of an emergency. Shamsian (2015) added, “Lockdown is offered as a
one-size-fits-all solution, equally useful in an earthquake as it is with a killer armed with an
assault rifle. Not all teachers think that makes sense” (p. 4).
ALICE points out the example of a Virginia Tech professor who survived the 2007
shooting. According to Shamsian (2015):
As evidence that its system works, ALICE training often mentions the story
of Liviu Librescu, the Virginia Tech professor and Holocaust survivor who held off the
gunman and helped more than 20 students escape during a mass shooting in 2007. His
actions, ALICE says, run counter to conventional lockdown wisdom—you need to act to
save lives. (p. 4)
ALICE argues that fighting back is the best course of action. Shamsian (2015) explained that
“the best course of action includes countering, which means figuring out ways to disrupt the
shooter, according to ALICE” (p. 4). The ALICE company trains educators to fight back without
the use of firearms. In the article, they do not claim either side of the political issue of whether
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teachers should be armed. According to Shamsian (2015), “While it does not dispute the right for
people to arm themselves, it warns that teachers are usually untrained and ill-suited to defend
others, and more likely to hurt students running around a classroom than stopping a mass killer”
(p. 9).
Summary
Active shooters on college campuses are an issue that has worsened over time. In
response, colleges and universities have created plans and provided active shooter trainings. The
next chapter seeks to determine the ways institutions of higher education in New Jersey have
developed and made available active shooter policies for their faculties. It will also seek to
discover the format of the training that is being provided and their accessibility for faculty.

34

Chapter 3: Methodology
This chapter will address data sources as well as the sample collected. Variables,
quantitative analysis, and subsidiary questions will be explained. The research questions are as
follows:


Research Question 1. To what extent and in what ways have institutions of higher
education (IHEs) in New Jersey developed policies for addressing “active
shooter” events in campus and have prepared their front-line teaching faculty for
“active shooter” encounters in the academic workplace?
o Research Question 1a. How many institutions have put in place formal,
written “active shooter” policies?
o Research Question 1b. How are these policies communicated to academic
staff?



Research Question 2. How are active shooter policies presented on the reported
institutions’ websites?
o Research Question 2a. Where are they located on the website?
o Research Question 2b. In what format are the policies available presented?
For example, online instructions/ pdf files, or web training videos.
o Research Question 2c. How are they accessed by faculty?
o Research Question 2d. Are there differences in policies and/or in the
dissemination of policies depending on the type of institution?
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Data Sources and Sample
The sample was collected from a webpage on the New Jersey Department of Higher
Education’s website.4 On the webpage, the New Jersey Department of Higher Education lists 91
institutions of higher education. That list serves as the population for data collection. The New
Jersey Department of Higher Education website also classifies institutions of higher education
into different categories: public research institutions, state colleges and universities,
county/community colleges, independent 4-year, proprietary institutions with degree granting
authority, Talmudical/theological institutions, independent 2-year, and independent 3-year. All
these categories were used.
I searched on the homepage of each institution’s website for their active shooter policy by
locating and utilizing the search bar. The Key words used to search for the active shooter policy
were “Active Shooter.” Institutions that had a search bar on their homepage and a policy that was
located using the search were recorded and coded. For every institution, beginning on the
homepage, I measured the amount of page path clicks reach the active shooter policy. The type
of policy available was recorded utilizing the categories Online Instructions, Web Video, or
None Reported. Categories such as Active Shooter, Emergency, Campus Life, Campus Services,
Students and Student Life, Policies and Disclosures, Public Safety, Information, Information and
Disclosures, and Campus Security were used to locate such policies on the institution’s website.
The original tab where the policy was located was also recorded. These categories were
inductively created after locating the policy and back tracking the number of clicks to the

4

The corresponding New Jersey Department of Higher Education webpage can be found at:

https://nj.gov/highereducation/colleges/schools_alfa.shtml.
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original tab on the homepage where the policy was eventually located. They are expressed in
terms of either Campus, Information and Disclosures, About, Faculty, Students, or Safety. The
data was input into an excel spreadsheet and collected from April 2020 to December 2020. These
categories were recorded and revised during the coding of the data process.
Method of Analysis
A quantitative content analysis was used to determine which active shooter policies are
available for faculty. A quantitative content analysis is defined by Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (2013)
as a “the systematic assignment of communication content to categories according to rules, and
the analysis of relationships involving those categories using statistical methods” (p. 3). A
content analysis will be able to illustrate the availability of protocols for faculty. This study seeks
to discover where faculty can find their policies and what kind of material is given to them and in
what form.
Variables
The coding variables for this study included whether or not the institution had an
available policy as well as the following:
1. Starting tabs: Every available website from each institution of higher education had a
homepage. From the homepage, there were a series of tabs located on the page that
are used to retrieve information about the respective institution. Those tabs are found
on a “main menu” bar or tab and include tabs labeled as, About, Academics,
Admissions, Campus/College Life, Community, Campus Safety, Students, Faculty
and Staff, Emergency Information, and Information and Disclosures.
2. Number of page path clicks: The second variable recorded was the number of page
path clicks from the starting tab on the home page to the page where the active

37

shooter policy could be located. This was done for each institution that had an
accessible active shooter policy. Every page was tried first with searches utilizing the
search bar attempted second.
3. Format of policy: The format of the policy was recorded. The format varied in online
instructions/pdf files and web video tutorials. It should be noted that the web video
tutorials should be thought of as another way to present information and do not
represent a formal policy. Those variables were recorded for each institution. If an
institution had both forms, then both forms were recorded for that institution.
4. Active shooter search: In some instances, there were institutions of higher education
that had a search bar. The phrase “active shooter” was entered into the search of the
website and results recorded. The purpose was to determine if the policy could be
located in a quicker fashion than manually clicking on varying starting tabs. The
results of those searches were recorded and coded.
5. Type of institution: The last variable is the type of institution. The New Jersey
Department of Higher Education website breaks down all recorded institutions into
different categories. They are public research, state colleges and universities,
county/community colleges, independent 4-year, proprietary institutions with degree
granting authority, Talmudic/theological seminaries, independent 2-year religious
colleges, and independent 3-year.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used for the initial data analysis. Out of 91 institutions of
higher education in New Jersey, 61 had an active shooter policy available on their website.
Percentages and summary statistics were used to determine the differences between categories of
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institutions, differences in protocol and availability, and the number of clicks to get to the policy.
Faculty union contracts were reviewed to determine if any of their content contained information
on campus safety in regard to an active shooter. According to cnjscl.org addressing New Jersey
State Colleges, the memorandum of agreement for faculty unions, Aft, Afl-Cio active shooter
and safety protocols were not addressed. Additionally, uhr.rutgers.edu displays the union
contracts for Aaup-Aft and again, no active shooter policy was stated. According to the U.S.
Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions of Higher Education, New Jersey has 26
Organized Directory Institutions of higher education covering 50 campuses with 41 organized
collective bargaining units with union contracts covering 20,965 faculty and staff (Berry, et al.,
2012, p. 60). The review of the union contracts did not yield any results pertaining to workplace
safety and active shooters at the time of this study and was thus no longer considered. Table 1
describes the approach taken to develop the data analysis plan.
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Table 1
Statement of Research Questions, Variables, and Analysis Plan
Research Question
To what extent and in what
ways have IHEs in NJ
developed policies for
addressing “active shooter”
events on campus? Or prepare
their front-line teaching
faculty for “active shooter”
encounters in the academic
workplace?
How are active shooter policies
presented on the reported
institutions’ websites?

Subsidiary Questions
Variable
How many institutions
The number of
have put in place formal,
institutions reporting
written “active shooter”
policies.
policies?
Search of active shooter
How are these policies
policy in search bar.
communicated to
Search of active shooter
academic staff?
policy in Union
Contracts.

Analysis Plan
Percentage
summary and
statistics

Where are they located on The tab of origin to find Percentage and
the website?
the policy on the home analysis of
In what format are the
page and amount of
variance.
policies available in?
page path clicks.
For example, online
Online instructions, pdf
instructions/ pdf files, or
files and web training
web training videos.
videos.
How are they accessed by Categories utilized by
faculty?
the NJ Department of
Are there differences in
Higher Education.
policies and/or in the
dissemination of policies
depending on the type of
institution?

Limitations
It is possible that institutions may not have active shooter policies on their websites but
may in fact have polices in place. The State of New Jersey recommends that institutions of
higher education have active shooter policies but does not make them mandatory (Canas &
Oates, 2007). Content analysis has its limitations as well. According to Schray (2019), “If a
researcher ignores context that words are used in or has bias, coding can be inaccurate and
findings thus invalid” (p. 40). I attempted to reduce bias in coding by searching for every
institution’s policy on their website and in union contracts using the same search words. Another
limitation is how frequently institutions of higher education update their websites. Another
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limitation is the amount of time being spent on updating the policy itself. Another limitation
considered is the number of visits an institution receives to its website. If policies are updated or
not updated on websites, results could be affected due to the lack of current information. For
example, an institution of higher education could have a policy in place and not have reported it
on their website. In that case, it is being reported that no policy is available when it is possible
that one is in place. The availability of faculty contracts and safety concerns addressed within
those labor contracts also limits the study.
Summary
My study includes a quantitative content analysis of 91 institutions of higher education
located in New Jersey and their active shooter policies. This chapter restated the original
research questions. The research seeks to find what kind of policy and protocol exist and the
differences among the different categories of institutions of higher education. Chapter 3 provided
the source of the research population and sample and methods used to collect the data. Chapter 4
will report the findings in detail.
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Chapter 4: Results
The focus of this chapter is the results of the research questions and their subsidiary
questions. In the first section of this chapter, I address the number of colleges in New Jersey that
report an active shooter policy or protocol. In the second section, I report on the format in which
the institutions present their active shooter protocol. The third section includes a discussion of
the location of active shooter protocol on their respective institutions’ website. Lastly, I discuss
the differences in how active shooter protocol is located through the number of page path clicks
from the websites’ main page and search bar on the main page to the published policy.
Comparisons were then made among the types of institutions.
The purpose of this study was to explore how active shooter policies at New Jersey
Institutions of Higher Education are accessed and presented to faculty through the use of their
websites. Using the websites as the primary data source, descriptive statistics are used to address
the research questions. The following is a restatement of the research questions:


Research Question 1. To what extent and in what ways have institutions of higher
education (IHEs) in New Jersey developed policies for addressing “active
shooter” events in campus and prepared their front-line teaching faculty for
“active shooter” encounters in the academic workplace?
o Research Question 1a. How many institutions have put in place formal,
written “active shooter” policies?
o Research Question 1b. How are these policies communicated to academic
staff?



Research Question 2. How are active shooter policies presented on the reported
institutions’ websites?
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o Research Question 2a. Where are they located on the website?
o Research Question 2b. In what format are the policies available presented?
For example, online instructions / PDF files, or web training videos.
o Research Question 2c. How are they accessed by faculty?
o Research Question 2d. Are there differences in policies and / or in the
dissemination of policies depending on the type of institution?
Figure 2 shows the number of institutions that had reported publishing active shooter
policies on their websites, compared to those who did not report any such policy. Figure 2 is
related to research question 1a. Forty-three institutions reported having policies on their website,
while 47 did not have a reported policy. Thus, 47% of all institutions have a reported policy
compared to 52% that did not. 34% of institutions with a search bar also had a reported policy
compared to 47% of institutions that had a policy utilizing page path clicks.
One institution was not included in the data set because only students, faculty, or staff
members with an account login and identification were able to access any such policy. Without
being able to access the policy, I could not determine what kind of policy was there (for
example, written instructions or video instructions). Furthermore, without being able to gain
access, I could not confirm if a policy even existed at the time my research was being conducted.
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Figure 2
Institutions and Policies

Figure 3 addresses the outcome of Research Question 1b: How are these policies
communicated to Academic Staff? Figure 3 is a breakdown of institutions with written
instructions (n = 28), video instructions (n = 4, and institutions with both written and video and
instructions (n = 11). Sixty-five percent of all reported institutions with a policy have written
instructions only. Nine percent have only video instructions and 26% of institutions have both
written and video instructions. All policies reported were located on their respective institutions’
websites.
Figure 2 shows 43 institutions have reported policy while 41 do not have a reported
policy compared to 47 that do not with one institution as an unknown. Figure 3 illustrates that 28
institutions utilize a written format of a policy compared to 4 that utilize a video format
compared to 11 that use both. To answer research question 1, institutions of higher education in
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New Jersey have utilized two kinds of format in order to disseminate information to faculty and
staff.

Figure 3
Type of Policy

I next addressed research questions 2, 2a, and 2b: How are active shooter policies
presented on the reported institutions’ websites?


Where are they located on the website?



In what format are the policies presented? For example, online instructions/pdf files, or
web training videos.
Table 2 displays all reported institutions with a policy in a detailed breakdown regarding

whether or not they have video or written instructions. I recorded the sources of those videos
along with the website location where the policy was located.
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Table 2
Institutions, Sources, and Website Locations
Name of School

Video (source)

PDF/Written (source)

Video length

Website location

Atlantic Cape Community College

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

No

5:56

Active Shooter Training Page

Bergen Community College

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

No

5:56

Surviving Active Shooter Event Page

Berkeley College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Public Safety Page

Bloomfield College

No

Yes (Dept of HS)

n/a

Emergency Resources

Camden County College

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

Yes (college/university)

5:56

Active Shooter Procedures

Centenary University

Yes (YouTube - Ohio State Channel)

No

9:32

Surviving Active Aggressor

County College of Morris

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

No

5:56

Public Safety Page

Drew University

Yes (college/university)

Yes (college/university)

20:00

Access/login required

Essex County College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Action Plan

Fairleigh Dickinson University

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

Yes (college/university)

5:56

Emergency Management

Felician University

No

Yes (Dept of HS)

n/a

Emergency Response Plan

Georgian Court University

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Ops Plan

Jersey College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Response Plan

Kean University

No

Yes (Dept of HS)

n/a

Emergency Management

Mercer County Community College

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

No

5:56

Middlesex County College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Monmouth University

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Actions
Emergency Response Quick Reference
Guide
Campus Safety Plan

Montclair State University

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Operations Plan

Morris County College of

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

No

5:56

Emergency Response Plan

New Jersey City University

Yes (college/university)

Yes (college/university)

3:56

Emergency Response Guide

New Jersey Institute of Technology

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Safety Page

Ocean County College

Yes (college/university)

No

7:41

Campus Security

Passaic County Community College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Public Safety

46

Name of School

Video (source)

PDF/Written (source)

Video length

Website location

Pillar College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Student Handbook

Princeton University

Yes (DHS; college/university)

Yes (FBI)

3:40

Department of Public Safety

Raritan Valley Community College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Campus Safety

Rider University

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Response Tips

Rowan College at Burlington County

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Campus Emergency Guide

Rowan College at Gloucester County

Yes (college/university)

Yes (college/university)

10:50

Safety and Security

Rowan University

Yes (Dept of HS)

n/a

Public Safety

No

7:43; 3:40

Emergency Action Plan

Saint Peter's University

No
Yes (college/university; YouTube UMiami channel)
No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Operations Plan

Salem Community College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Public Safety

Seton Hall University

Yes (college/university)

Yes (college/university)

5:56

Public Safety

Stevens Institute of Technology

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Campus Police

Stockton University

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Response Guide

Sussex County Community College

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Student and Campus Safety

The College of New Jersey

Yes (YouTube - Ready Houston channel)

No

5:56

Emergency Response Procedures

Union County College

Yes (US Dept of HS; YouTube - UMiami) Yes (Dept of HS)

3:40

Public Safety

Warren County Community College

Yes (college/university)

Yes (college/university)

3:36

Campus Safety

William Paterson University of New Jersey

No

Yes (college/university)

n/a

Emergency Procedures

Rutgers, The State University of NJ
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Beginning with Figure 4, my analysis includes institutions that have an active shooter
policy and excludes all those institutions that do not have a policy. Figure 4 displays the
differences in the types of video sources from which institutions draw polices. Fifty-two percent
(n = 23) of institutions did not report a video. Eighteen percent (n = 8) reported using the “Ready
Houston” YouTube channel as their source for video instruction: 18% (n = 8) of the videos come
from the institution itself, 5% (n = 2) use the University of Miami YouTube Channel, 5% (n = 2)
use the Department of Homeland Security video, and 2% (n = 1) use the Ohio State University
YouTube channel. When Ready Houston, Ohio State, and University of Miami YouTube
Channels were combined, eleven institutions utilized YouTube video that was not produced by
the institution itself (n =11).
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Figure 4
Videos by Source

Figure 5 shows institutions that use written instructions, with a breakdown of the sources
used for their policies. Sixty-three percent of all written sources come from the institution itself,
22% have no written source, 12% use the Department of Homeland Security, and 2% of
institutions use the FBI as their source for a written active shooter policy.
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Figure 5
Written Instructions by Source

The results from the final two research questions are discussed in the following section:


How are active shooter policies accessed by faculty?



Are there differences in policies and/or in the dissemination of policies depending on the
type of institution?
As stated previously, the number of page path clicks from the home page was recorded

for each institution type. The categories of institutions are defined by the New Jersey Department
of Higher Education. Figure 6 illustrates a breakdown of all institutions by category. Community
colleges account for 22% (n = 20) of institutions, independent 2-year account for 1% (n = 1),
independent 3-year make up 1% (n = 1), independent 4-year account for 16% (n = 15),
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proprietary institutions constitute 13% (n = 12), public research institutions make up 4% (n = 4),
state colleges make up 7% (n = 6) and Talmudical institutions make up 34% (n = 31).

Figure 6
Number of Institutions Samples by Type

Figure 7 shows a breakdown of the category of institutions with a policy. Community
colleges accounted for 40% (n = 17), independent 4 year for 30% (n = 13), proprietary
institutions for 7% (n = 3), public research for 9% (n = 4), state colleges for 12% (n = 5), and
Talmudical for 2% (n = 1).
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Figure 7
Percentage of Institutions by Type with a Published Policy

In order to determine whether institution type is related to having a policy, I conducted a
chi-square analysis. The results of the chi-square analysis reveal a significant association
between institution type and having a policy: X2 (7) = 55.17, p < .001. Community colleges and
independent 4-year colleges were disproportionately more likely to have a policy, whereas
Talmudical schools were disproportionately less likely to have a policy. See Table 3.
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Table 3
Crosstabulation of Having a Policy by Institution Type
Type of Institution
Community college

Independent 4 yr.

Prop

Public Research

State College

Talmudical

Count
Expected count
% within type
Standardized residual
Count
Expected count
% within type
Standardized residual
Count
Expected count
% within type
Standardized residual
Count
Expected count
% within type
Standardized residual
Count
Expected count
% within type
Standardized residual
Count
Expected count
% within type
Standardized residual

Does not have policy
3
10.5
15.00%
-2.3
1
0.5
100.00%
0.7
1
0.5
100.00%
0.7
2
7.9
13.30%
-2.1
9
6.3
75.00%
1.1
0
2.1
0.00%
-1.5

Has policy
17
9.5
85.00%
2.5
0
0.5
0.00%
-0.7
0
0.5
0.00%
-0.7
13
7.1
86.70%
2.2
3
5.7
25.00%
-1.1
4
1.9
100.00%
1.5

Figure 8 displays the number of institutions of each type with no policy. Community
colleges accounted for 6% (n = 3), independent 2 year accounted for 2% (n = 1), independent 3
year accounted for 2% (n = 1), independent 4 year accounted for 4% (n = 2), proprietary
institutions accounted for 19% (n = 9), state colleges accounted for 2% (n = 1), and Talmudical
schools accounted for 64% (n = 30). There are several possibilities for this discrepancy with
Talmudical institutions. One such reason could be their small student population. Talmudical
schools tend to be located within communities and do not necessarily have a large or gated
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campus to hold a large student population. Their educational purpose is religious and specific in
nature; however, not having a policy could be problematic given the religious nature of these
institutions which will be further discussed in chapter 5.

Figure 8
Types of Institutions with No Policy

In order to determine whether number of clicks differs by institution type, I conducted a
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results of the ANOVA indicate there is no
significant difference in number of clicks by institution type: F(5,38) = 1.77, p = .14. See Tables
4 and 5.
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Table 4
Mean and SD for Number of Clicks by Institution Type
Institution type
Community College

N
17

Mean
2.65

SD
0.7

Independent 4-year

13

3.15

0.9

Prop

3

2

0

Public Research

4

3.25

0.5

State College

6

2.83

0.98

Talmudical

1

2

n/a
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Table 5
Results of ANOVA for Number of Clicks by Institution Type
Source
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

SS

df

MS

F

p-value

5.387
23.158
28.545

5
38
43

1.077
0.609

1.768

0.143

In order to determine whether policy format type varies by institution type, I conducted a
chi-square analysis. The results of the chi-square analysis reveal no significant association
between institution type and policy type: X2(10) = 6.57, p = .77. See Table 6.
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Table 6
Crosstabulation of Policy Format Type by Institution Type

Community college
Independent 4-year
Prop
Public Research
State College
Talmudical

Count
% within format type
Count
% within format type
Count
% within format type
Count
% within format type
Count
% within format type
Count
% within format type

Online
instruction
9
52.90%
9
69.20%
3
100.00%
3
75.00%
3
60.00%
1
100.00%

Online instruction
+ video
7
41.20%
2
15.40%
0
0.00%
1
25.00%
1
20.00%
0
0.00%

Video
1
5.90%
2
15.40%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
1
20.00%
0
0.00%

Less than half of institutions of higher education in New Jersey have a reported policy.
The research has shown that of those institutions with a policy there are no differences between
types of institutions and page path clicks in order to access those policies. The most common
policies located were either YouTube videos or online written instructions. Again, I found that
there were no statistical differences between policy format type and institution type. Talmudic
institutions were the institution type that most often reported no policy that could be located in
contrast to community colleges that had the highest number of institutions reporting a policy.
Further detailed discussion of the findings will take place in Chapter 5 of this study.
Summary
This chapter provides a discussion of the research questions posed in Chapter 1. I began
by addressing which institutions of higher education presented policies on their websites that
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address active shooter protocol. Second, I addressed how those policies were presented in their
respective formats, such as written instructions or a training video, along with the source material
of those formats from which institutions could format their active shooter policy. Third, I
addressed where on the respective websites active shooter protocol could be located and
recorded the amount of page path clicks from the home page to the policy. I performed statistical
analysis to compare differences among institution type with regard to the format of the policy
presented as well as the number of page path clicks to get to the policy. The final chapter in this
study will provide a discussion of the findings, limitations, and potential for future research.
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Chapter 5
This chapter will discuss and explain the findings of the study. It shall address
limitations, future research, and draw a conclusion from the results of the data gathered. As
stated earlier in the research, active shooters on college campuses are on an upward trend. Since
the Virginia Tech incident, the policy response in New Jersey was made into recommendations
by Governor Corzine’s administration to incorporate active shooter protocol across the state’s
college campuses. Those recommendations were not made mandatory. Since that time, 47
institutions in New Jersey have active shooter policies that cannot be located. In contrast, 43
institutions have an active shooter policy. As of now, less than half of the institutions of higher
education in New Jersey have a reported active shooter policy that could be located. As
discussed earlier in the literature review, this is surprising given the fact that active shooters on
campus are a problem that seems to be growing in frequency.
The majority of institutions of higher education in New Jersey that do not have an active
shooter policy are Talmudical institutions. Those institutions make up 64% of the institutions
that do not have an active shooter policy. According to the FBI’s uniform crime report of 2018,
religious bias crimes accounted for 18.7% of all religious bias incidents in the state of New
Jersey. Of those bias based anti-religious crimes, 56.9% were considered anti-Jewish bias crimes.
This is significant due to the fact that Talmudical schools in New Jersey make up the majority of
institutions that do not have an active shooter policy governing their faculty to handle an active
shooter event should one occur at their institution. Talmudic institutions included all religious
variations in the coding. The research presents the situation that Talmudic institutions, and
especially Jewish institutions, are generally more likely to be a vulnerable target from their lack
of active shooter policy and their religious nature. According to the data collected only one
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Talmudic institution was reported to have a policy on its website: the New Brunswick
Theological Seminary, which is not a Jewish institution. Thus, given the vulnerability to violence
of people of the Jewish religion, it is a concerning finding that no Jewish institutions had active
shooter policies that could be located in the current study.
The chi square analysis revealed that community colleges and independent 4-year
institutions were significantly more likely to have an active shooter policy than their Talmudical
counterparts. Anecdotal evidence comes from personal communication with a member within the
law enforcement community, stationed at a 4-year institution of higher education in New Jersey.
When inquiring about resources and supports for implementing active shooter policies in higher
education, I was informed by the officer that community colleges in New Jersey do not receive
any kind of monetary aid for having action plans for active shooters. Although community
colleges may not receive aid directly for active shooter preparedness, they do receive tax funding
given their public nature. Talmudical schools are private and religious in nature, and most of
their funding may come from student tuition or the religious institution itself. Thus, Talmudic
institutions possibly have less funding to address active shooter protocols specifically.
Of the 43 institutions that have active shooter policies, there are two types of formats
through which the policies are distributed. They are either written or video format. Both forms of
policies were located on each individual institution’s website. The majority of institutions (63%)
with a written policy publish their own policy on their website. The most common outside source
utilized for active shooter policy was the Department of Homeland Security protocol which
accounted for 12% compared to the FBI which accounted for only 2%. The FBI’s active shooter
protocol was utilized the least for active shooter written policies. The Investigative Assistance
for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, signed into law in 2013, allows the FBI to assist local agencies
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and take the lead role in training first responders. Yet, the research shows the FBI’s protocol is
utilized the least.
While a majority of institutions did not have a video policy, the most common source
used by institutions was YouTube at 61%. It is important to note that the Department of
Homeland Security was the second least common source used at 5%. In both written and video
source material the most common source was neither the FBI or the Department of Homeland
Security. Thirty-eight percent of the institutions utilizing video had their own source material.
When determining how institutions’ policies are accessed an ANOVA test was
conducted. The ANOVA revealed there were no significant differences between institution type
and the amount of page path clicks it took to find the policy. In contrast, the chi square analysis
revealed no significant difference between types of policies and types of institutions. In terms of
how active shooter policies are accessed, the research determined no significant difference
among institutions and the amount of page path clicks it takes to get to the policy. The largest
mean of page path clicks reported were for Public Research institutions at 3.25 and the lowest
was 2.0 for Proprietary institutions with degree granting authority and one Talmudical institution
reported at 2.0. When policies were available on their respective institutions’ websites, the
research found there were no statistically significant differences in the amount of page path
clicks and institution type. Thus, a conclusion can be made that when a policy is available,
generally speaking, it is only a few clicks away which makes for a shorter time locating that
policy. What the research did find was the most vulnerable institutions were the Talmudical
schools. The research determined the most prepared institutions were community colleges and 4year independent institutions when compared to Talmudical institutions.
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Limitations
The main limitation to the study is that institutions of higher education were limited to
the State of New Jersey. No other states’ institutions of higher education were considered in this
study. New Jersey has, thankfully, not experienced a high profile on-campus active shooter event
such as Virginia Tech or the University of Texas Bell Tower event. Further research can be
conducted in those states in order to find out how faculty locate and access those policies to
handle an active shooter event. One institution’s active shooter policy was not accessible for the
general public. Ramapo College required access for only current faculty, students, and staff. This
is a limitation due to the fact that I cannot definitively report on whether or not an active shooter
policy exists from conducting the research—only whether it could be found. The Campus
Security Taskforce made several recommendations that were stated earlier in the literature
review. Furthermore, given recent crime analysis conducted by the FBI’s Uniformed Crime
Report, the Talmudical schools given their religious nature pose a target for violent behavior.
Governor Corzine’s Campus Security Taskforce made recommendations that were not mandated.
Mental health awareness, counselors, and crisis intervention teams were recommended and
suggested by the Campus Security Task Force to have one counselor for every 1,500 students.
The nature of having small student populations being specific in religious fields of study,
Talmudical institutions are under no mandated obligation to have such protocols in place. There
are no policies reported on their website, however, this does not necessarily mean they do not
exist. The research also mentioned this in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 several limitations of the study
were addressed.
If policies are updated or not updated on websites, results could be affected by not
providing current information. For example, an institution of higher education could have a
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policy in place and not have reported it on their website. In that case, it is being reported that no
policy is available when it is possible that one is in place. The availability of faculty contracts
and safety concerns addressed within those labor contracts also limits the study. Put simply, if an
institution has a policy in place that is not specified on their website, then the results of the data
analysis could be affected by under reporting institutions that have active shooter protocol. This
could lead to issues with the institution itself. Even if the institution has a policy, no one can
individually access the policy. To further clarify, It is possible that the institution has a policy,
but it is not made readily available. The coding for the research was done solely by me. It was
then cross checked by a second coder ensuring the coding reliability and validity prior to
computing the data.s
Future Research
Future research should address what formats are active shooter protocols available for
faculty outside of New Jersey. At the time of this study, New Jersey only has recommendations
for active shooter protocol in place for institutions of higher education. Future research should
include whether or not individual states have similar recommendations or legislation in place
mandating institutions of higher education have accessible active shooter policies. Furthermore,
different states have different gun laws as they pertain to carrying on college campuses.
According to Williams (2017), “Unlike Georgia’s neighboring state of Florida (H.B. 2005) that
made it legal for any individual at least 21 years of age with a license to carry to bring a firearm
to college campuses, Georgia does not permit firearms at colleges and universities” (p. 7).
Additional research can seek to determine if there are differences among institutions’ active
shooter policies and their accessibility when compared to institutions with strict ‘no guns on
campus’ laws compared to states that allow guns on campus. It is possible that a state such as
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Florida could have a different perspective on personal safety culturally speaking. Thus, allowing
individuals that are a part of the campus community to make an individual choice as to whether
or not they want to carry a firearm on campus for personal protection. If a state like Florida has
similar policy allowing individuals to carry firearms on campus, future research could measure
the accessibility of active shooter policies and compare them to a state that prohibits firearms on
campus.
Future research could also evaluate the differences in source material and quality of
active shooter policy. For example, does Florida value ‘Run, Hide, Fight’ or lockdown
procedures? Is there an emphasis on fight rather than run or hide? Those results could be
compared to Georgia’s active shooter policy where carrying firearms is prohibited. Georgia may
value ‘Run, Hide, Fight’ or emphasize lockdown procedures. It could be possible that Georgia
may utilize the FBI or Department of Homeland Security for its source material. All of this could
be determined in future research. Florida and Georgia would be an interesting comparison due to
their neighboring proximity as well as differing legislation.
Future research should also consider surveying faculty to test their knowledge and their
comfortability after reviewing their institution’s policy. Such research has been recently
conducted. Williams (2017) focused his study was on development, implementation, and issues
associated with the active shooter plan of Southern Tech. Southern Tech is a 2-year community
college, and its students and faculty were participants of the study. Future research should
consider all types of institutions in testing the knowledge of their respective faculty after it is
determined how their protocol is accessed. For example, future research should question the
content of their policies and compare it to their accessibility. In turn the accessibility could be
compared to the content of the policy. For instance, are there a lower number of page path clicks
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to access a poor-quality policy or are there higher numbers of page path clicks to access a good
quality policy. Future research can also compare source material for policies. Are agencies such
as the FBI utilized more than the DHS? Future research should address these concerns.
In New Jersey, there are campuses that utilize on campus police departments to keep the
campus community safe and solve crime on campus. Not all campuses utilize an on campus 24hour police department. Future research should include whether or not campuses with their own
24-hour police departments have differences in accessibility to their institution’s active shooter
policy when compared to campuses that do not. Furthermore, future research should also include
differences among institution type and the size of the police department on that particular
institution’s campus. For example, Rutgers University’s police department may have the size and
available manpower and resources compared to Middlesex County College or Kean University.
Future research should be able to determine whether or not these variances exist.
Implications for Policy and Practice
As stated, prior in the study, the State of New Jersey during the Governor Corzine
administration came up with recommendations for institutions of higher education for their
active shooter protocol. Small Talmudical colleges are most vulnerable with their lack of
protocol. Community Colleges and large Public Research institutions are shown to have the most
protocols in place. Given the fact that the FBI reported that the Jewish/Judaism religious group
are represented in over half of the reported religious bias crimes, the research illustrates
government recommendations and small private Talmudic institutions with their lack of
accessible active shooter protocol have a policy disconnect.
In New Jersey, there are procedures that can be put in place sooner rather than later to
address the concerns of accessibility of active shooter policy. Faculty and staff can receive
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training when first coming onto the job on a new campus. This can take place in the form of a
lecture by other faculty, staff, or local law enforcement; however, if the wave of the future is
online and the use of social media grows, training can be conducted through those means.
Training students could also benefit faculty and staff. With the combination of social
media and students, active shooter policy can be accessed in a more efficient manner. In a study
conducted at Iowa State University, students utilized Blackboard and Facebook as learning based
modules and the two platforms were then compared. It was found that students preferred to use
Facebook citing Facebook’s user-friendly nature when compared to Blackboard in order to
receive and discuss information (Tess, 2013, p. A63). Given this approach, institutions of higher
education could put to use their own social media accounts in order to reach active shooter and
safety policy to large amounts of people across the campus community.
On the level of the local police agency and speaking from personal experience, police
agencies and municipalities have been working together to address those individuals in need of
mental health assistance. Currently, at the agency where I am employed in New Jersey, the
municipality took initiative in employing mental health “coaches” designated to attempt to help
those individuals who may be identified by police as emotionally disturbed or exhibiting some
sort of mental health illness or crisis. This happens when these individuals are taken to local
crisis units at local hospitals. Their basic pedigree information is placed into the CAD system
and the coach is notified. The coach then reaches out to the victim in the coming days after their
hospital visit. The coach discusses with them if they would like to receive help or if they would
like further assistance. Future research and implications for institutions of higher education could
determine if similar practices by college or university teams show an overall reduction in
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shootings or violent crime after implicating such notifications by law enforcement to mental
health coaches and professionals.
It is important to note that the 2007 task force made recommendations and not laws.
Following the incident at Virginia Tech, institutions of higher education may have put active
shooter policies in place simply to reduce their own legal liability. Although institutions of
higher education may have an ulterior motive, the value of available active shooter policies still
possess the potential to save lives and mitigate risks. In a 2020 article by Liz Hurly on behalf of
WAFF48, a local news station that serves the Alabama Huntsville area, similar policies were
implemented after Dr. Amy Bishop’s shooting incident. According to the article, the University
implemented background checks, an alert system to send information out quickly to the campus
community when an active shooter incident takes place, and the establishment of behavioral
evaluation and threat assessment team to respond to any member of the campus community
exhibiting potential active shooter behavior.
In response to the shooting at Northern Illinois the University had active shooter policies
in place yet an attack still occurred. The state of Illinois responded making certain active shooter
policies mandatory and not simply recommended. In Northern Illinois’ report (2008) of the
incident involving Steven Kazmierczak, in direct response to the Virginia Tech incident and the
incident at Northern Illinois, threat assessment teams were made mandatory on all campuses
throughout the state, mental health experts were added, and police presence on campus was
bolstered. While the university made adjustments, it was determined there was no major
overhaul that could be found that needed to take place to already existing policies.
The University of Texas (n.d.) has taken additional steps to combat active shooters
besides giving access to ‘Run, Hide, Fight’ protocol. Texas has utilized target hardening and
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giving access to first aid materials to its campus community to combat active shooters.
According to the University of Texas emergency management website, faculty, students, and
staff are required to use their IDs as keys at designated doors on campus. Additionally, the
university has what it designates as safety hubs around campus containing first aid and bleeding
kits, automated external defibrillators, and call boxes. Instructions to use the equipment are
located with the equipment.
Training and Professional Development as Institutional Response
Training is extremely vital in the prevention, recognition, reporting, and responding to
active shooter behavior. Training college professors in the awareness of these behaviors can
assist in curtailing active shooters and saving lives. The goal of this training curriculum is for
college professors to have a general knowledge of potential active shooter behavior, report it
appropriately to the proper authorities, and have the knowledge to respond appropriately to an
active shooter on campus. Removing the fear of the unknown and giving professors a base
knowledge should foster a level of confidence in dealing with an emergency on campus.
Active shooter data and research from law enforcement agencies and mental health
academic journals would be the most effective way to present material on active shooter
behavior and response. The units should break down into four primary units. First, an
introduction to the problem, then the signs and symptoms and awareness, next would be
reporting, and finally responding to an active shooter event. Evaluation could be done at the end
with a survey of the target audience, which in this case is college faculty. The goal would be to
give structure and confidence to report and combat an active shooter.
The content of this curriculum should include examples of active shooter events and how
campus and school personnel responded during the event. The sequence of the learning
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experience should follow an order of examples of active shooter behavior and observe what was
done or not done prior to the shooting or violent event, followed by the event itself and the
response to the incident. That order of material should also be included in the sequence of
materials. The learners in this case are college professors and faculty. Instructional activities may
include a simple power point presentation or lecture by an individual who is regularly trained to
recognize and respond to such incidents. Campus, local, state, or federal law enforcement may
provide the best knowledge in such cases. Materials may include data resources such as the
examples provided earlier and past examples of active shooter incidents. The goal is to provide
awareness, reporting, and response.
The setting for instruction can be the classroom. The instructor should be in the field of
law enforcement and, if possible, should be an expert in the active shooter field. The instructor
should set, “Standards of mastery set for each unit of learning by experts in the field” (Stark &
Latuka, 1997, p. 219). A law enforcement expert would be best suited to train professors. Law
enforcement and police officers across the country already instruct K-12 faculty in regard to
active shooters.
The goal at the end of the training session would be to have all in attendance trained and
leaving with confidence in their abilities to be aware, report, and respond to active shooter
behavior. While there need not be a formal grading process, students should be able to
understand and apply the material when needed. The goal is not to train college professors to
become law enforcement experts in the field of active shooters; however, they should have the
confidence to act appropriately if and when an active shooter event occurs on campus. The
training would be presented as a standard way of handling an active shooter event.
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Conclusion
In this study I attempted to explore how college faculty and staff are accessing active
shooter policy in the state of New Jersey. It is my hope that my research shows the necessity of
granting easy access to educational tools and protocols that may help save lives should an active
shooter incident occur. Having been in high school during the Columbine shooting and an
undergraduate in college during the Virginia Tech shooting, the subject of school safety is
important to me. Having chosen a career in law enforcement coupled with a passion for higher
education, safety on college campus has always been an intriguing topic to personally explore.
The results that stand out the most are the under preparedness of the Talmudical institutions
policy wise given their religious nature. It was also surprising to note that the FBI and
Department of Homeland Security were not the most often used source material for providing
active shooter policy. When it comes to institutions with an active shooter policy, there is no
significant difference in accessing their protocol on their websites.
These policies were developed in the aftermath of history of active shooters on college
campuses. The literature review illustrates that an active shooter can come at any time and is not
always a student. In the years after Virginia Tech, New Jersey institutions of higher education
have made improvements in dealing with a potential crisis. The research conducted still shows
that different types of institutions still need to make significant improvements in developing and
granting access to policy and training. The impact of effective accessibility to policy and training
cannot be overstated in creating a safe learning environment.
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